Nullity of contracts in the Spanish and the Philippines Civil Code

14 páginas.Trabajo de Curso de Experto Universitario en Derecho Español Impartido en Inglés: Estudio de Conjunto (2014/15). Tutor: D. José Manuel de Torres Perea. The Philippine Civil Code is strongly influenced by the Spanish Civil Code which was approved by Royal Decree of July 24th, 1889. There are many similarities between our Civil Codes that can be noted but there are also significant differences. The purpose of this report is to give a comparative legal view of one common legal category regulated in our Civil Codes, which is nullity of contracts.El Código Civil Filipino está enormemente influenciado por el Código Civil español que fue aprobado por Real Decreto de 24 de julio de 1889. Hay muchas similitudes entre nuestros dos Códigos Civiles pero también diferencias relevantes. El objeto del presente trabajo es mostrar una visión comparada de una categoría legal comúnmente regulada en ambos Códigos Civiles, que es la nulidad de los contratos

Does the unemployment benefit institution affect the productivity of workers? Evidence from a field experiment

We investigate whether and how the type of unemployment benefit institution affects productivity. We designed a field experiment to compare workers' productivity under a welfare system, where the unemployed receive an unconditional monetary transfer, with their productivity under a workfare system, where the transfer is received conditional on the unemployed spending some time on ancillary activities. First, we find that having an unemployment benefit institution, regardless of whether it makes transfers conditional or unconditional, increases workers' productivity. Second, we find that productivity is higher under Welfare than under Workfare. Becoming unemployed under Welfare comes at the psychological cost of a drop in self-esteem, presumably due to the shame or stigma associated with receiving an unconditional unemployment benefit. We document the empirical relevance of precisely this channel. The differences we observe in productivity suggest that this psychological cost acts as an extra nonmonetary incentive for workers under Welfare to put a higher effort in their work

El sindicalismo español frente a las nuevas estrategias empresariales de trabajo y empleo

En este artículo se reflexiona e indaga acerca del momento actual del sindicalismo español. Se sostiene la idea de que son tantos los cambios a los que debe hacer frente que se encuentra en una verdadera encrucijada. Casi todos esos cambios proceden del ámbito empresarial. Cambia la organización del trabajo, cambia el ámbito de competencia empresarial —cada vez más mundializada—, se acentúan los procesos de subcontratación interempresarial, cambian las políticas de empleo y con ellas la precariedad laboral. Pero también proceden de una nueva composición de la clase asalariada. El movimiento sindical, tradicionalmente masculino, se encuentra con que las mujeres se han incorporado masivamente al mercado de trabajo. Hacer frente a todos estos retos con una escasa afiliación sindical se torna complejo y problemático

OPTIMAL PRICING AND GRANT POLICIES FOR MUSEUMS

Considering two potential sources of income (public grants and ticket revenues),we have defined a theoretical model where the public agency is the principal and the manager of the museum is the agent. This model allows us to design the optimal contract between both sides and thus to establish the optimal values of grants, ticket prices, budget and effort applied by the manager. Furthermore, we have found a theoretical reason to explain the inelastic pricing strategy that has been found in some of the empirical research on cultural and sports economics. The main conclusion is that the optimal contract allows a Pareto optimum solution in prices that does not change if we introduce moral hazard into this relationship. This solution allows us to conclude that the public agency should regulate ticket prices in accordance with the social valuation. However, public grants and museum budgets would be affected by the existence of this problem, moving the equilibrium away from the Pareto optimum situation. In this case, even with a risk averse manager and a risk neutral public agency, grants and budgets will depend on results because higher budgets related to good results provide the main incentives to increase the manager’s level of effort. Although the focus of this paper is on museum administration, the model that we have developed can be easily generalized and applied to other institutions, such as schools, sport facilities or NGOs, which are able to raise funds directly from private (e. g. ticket revenues or membership fees) or public sources (e.g. public grants).cultural economics, grants, public prices, museums, principal- agent model

A NEW OUTCOME MEASURE FOR COST-UTILITY ANALYSES OF SCREENING PROGRAMS

In this paper we provide a new outcome measure for the cost-utility analyses of alternative screening programs of a particular disease. We show that for non-invasive screening programs satisfying plausible assumptions, QALYs can be replaced by a simpler outcome: the sensitivity of the program. In other words, the cost-utility analysis can be made without computing the utility each program offers. Consequently, results would be immune to two of the most controversial issues in the cost-utility analysis approach: the elicitation method to obtain quality weights of health profiles, and the discount rate for future health benefits. The assumptions are particularly suitable in the case of selecting between the universal and the selective implementation of a non-invasive screening program. Therefore, we apply our result to provide an additional viewpoint in the current debate about the implementation of a universal or selective newborn screening program to detect congenital hearing impairment.Cost-utility analysis, cost-sensitivity ratios, screening programs,

OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS OF NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS

There exist congenital diseases that reduce newborns' potential opportunities. This reduction is sometimes alleviated if the congenital disease is early detected thanks to a newborn screening program. We propose an outcome measurement of newborn screening programs based on the opportunity gains they offer after its implementation. We show that, under plausible assumptions, preferences among the available screening programs for a particular disease according to this new outcome measurement, do not depend on the metric of opportunity. We also apply our model to the current debate about choosing between a selective or a universal newborn hearing screening program to detect congenital hearing impairment.Opportunity analysis, potential success, screening programs